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EPIEIKEIA; EQUITABLE LAWMAKING
IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES
by Raynwnd B. Marcin*
There is a gremlin in the law. An amicable but troublesome imp
which, from all evidence, has lived for as long as there has been law
and which, in all reckoning, is very probably immortal. Aristotle gave
the gremlin a name. He called it Epieikeia.
Epieikeia rises every now and again to expose the fallacy in the
sometimes-voiced truism that legislatures legislate and judges judge.
Judges do sometimes legislate, i.e., make law, when under the influence of epieikeia they carve a humane but legislatively unprovided-for
exception out of an otherwise applicable statute, or when for humane
reasons they extend the application of a statute to a situation which it
does not by its terms cover. Yet judges, when they do this, almost
never give the credit to epieikeia; indeed they seem curiously hostile
to the idea that such a gremlin even exists.
ORIGINS
Long before remembered time, when humankind was first beginning to survive in consistency and order, there arose a problem
which, with perplexing durability, has unsettled every legal tradition
from that early day to this.' It was the enigma of the socially directed
rule and the individuated set of facts. The socially directed rule is
almost always an abstraction. But every set of facts to which that rule
can be applied is a concrete entity. And there is no necessary identity

* A.B., St. John's Seminary (1959); A.B., Fairfield University (1961); J.D. Fordham

Law School (1964); Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America
School of Law.
1. Before that early dawn, folkways, customs, religious taboos, and the direct commands given by a leader to those who followed probably determined the content of
what we would call "law." R. WOMMSER, THE STORY OF THE LAw 3-5 (1962). There
must have come a time when there were too many followers for the leader to control
conveniently with individually directed commands. "In any large group general rules,
standards, and principles must be the main instrument of social control, and not particular directions given to each individual separately." H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw
121 (1961).
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between the two. 2 Therein lies the difficulty. Often a gap is left be-

tween the rule and the set of facts. A judge will be faced with the
decision whether to fill the gap by making law equitably. A wellconceived and well-expressed socially directed rule will at best fit almost all the sets of facts that it ought to fit and almost none of the
sets of facts that it ought not to fit. Of course, the perfectly conceived
and perfectly expressed socially directed rule will fit every set of facts
that it ought to fit and no set of facts that it ought not to fit. But it
must be admitted that the perfectly conceived and expressed rule has
thus far escaped, and without specific Divine intervention is likely to
continue to escape, human artisanry. Phrased in this way, the perennial problem of the socially directed rule and the individuated set of
facts is one of human fallibility. 3 The same characteristic quickens the
gremlin of which we speak.
In Western legal tradition the origin of the problem of the socially directed rule may be traced to the Mesopotamian civilizations
of the third millenium B.C. and their view of natural law as "abstract,
universally applicable commands of God to all mankind." 4 That
Mesopotamian view diffused into the legal philosophies of Greece,
especially the philosophy of the Stoics, and those philosophies in turn
came to influence the legal thinking of Rome. 5 In Rome, however,
the socially directed rule encountered a local Latin tradition which
conceived of law in terms of legal precedent rather than abstract,
preordained natural law. 6 This Latin tradition looked not so much on
the socially directed rule as on the decision of the individual judge in
the individual case as constituting "law. "'7 Thus early local Roman
2. See C. OGDEN & I. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING 11 (4th ed. 1936);
Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARv. L. REV. 863, 868-69 (1930).
3. "Men's Actions are so diverse and infinite, That it is impossible to make any
general Law which may aptly meet with every particular Act, and not fail in some Circumstances." Earl of Oxford's Case, 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 486 (Ch. 1615). See also
Ehrenzweig's discussion of human fallibility in the face of questions concerning the
meaning ofjustice. A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE 34 (1971).
4. L. POSPISIL, THE ETHNOLOGY OF LAW 8 (1972).
5. Id. (citing M. CICERO, DE LEGIBUS, (C. Keyes trans. 1928) and J. NEEDIIAN, SCIENCE AND CIVILIZATION IN CHINA 534 (1956)).
6.

7.

L. POSPISIL, supra note 4, passim.

Although Roman law rested on an archaic codification of abstract rules called
Lex Duodecim Tabularum (Law of the Twelve Tables) in theory as well as in

practice these rules did not automatically bind the Roman judges and lawyers.
They were guides, a framework to be interpreted and adjusted to the issues
arising from actual disputes ....
Id. at 8.
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tradition contemplated lawmaking by judges. The MesopotamianStoic idea that the abstract socially directed rule was the "law" conflicted with the Roman positivist-realist tradition of judicial lawmaking. The Mesopotamian view eventually prevailed. Judicial lawmaking
in the interpreting of socially directed rules was formally prohibited
by the Code of Justinian. 8
The Roman experience is of interest because it shaped the problem in practical terms and drew the philosophic battle lines between
the positivists and the naturalists. 9 The Romans, of course, did not
solve the problem of the socially directed rule and the individuated
set of facts. Indeed, the Code's attempt to end equitable lawmaking
by judges very soon broke down, as it had to, and echoes of the
Roman jurists' arguments over "legislative intent" are with us today.
It is the thesis of this article that we are repeating that Roman
experience today. We too have had our era of judicial lawmaking. We
too have developed the conventional wisdom that judges cannot make
law. And we too have seen the clash of these two attitudes in the
hard case. Our answer to date has been to dei ) that ethereal and
often nonexistent sprite called legislative intent: even as we make
equitable law in the hard case, we eschew the credit and ascribe the
deed to the lawmakers' foresight, which we presume to have discovered somewhere in the rule itself or in its trappings.
The problem inherent in the socially directed rule and the individuated set of facts has generated many differing accommodations, if
not solutions. Pre-Justinian Rome sought a solution in the interpretatio of commentating jurists.' 0 Christian canonists institutionalized the Roman interpretatio and refined it into a hierarchy of
types." Others sought a solution in the legal fiction.' 2 For some reformers, the solution lay in legislation itself.' 3 For many the accommodation lay in a separate judicial system. 14 But to many, at least
8.

Id. at 8-9.
9. See M. CICERO, ON THE COM.MON wEALTH, bk. III, ch. 2 reprinted in THE
NATURAL LAW READER 54 (B. Brown ed. 1960), for perhaps the most articulate and
certainly the strongest presentation of the natural-law view.
10. Schiller, Jurists'Law, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1226 (1958).
11. J. ABBO & J. HANNAN, THE SACRED CA.NONs 32 (1960).
12. See generally L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967); H. MAINE, . ANCiET LAW
25-28 (London 1861).
13. E.g., Justinian. See also J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION (C. Ogden
ed. 1931); H. MAINE, supra note 12, at 29-30.
14.

That is, equity. See T. PLUCKINETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COh.iON LAW

673 et seq. (5th ed. 1956); H. MAINE, supra note 12, at 28-29, 31-33.
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since the days of Aristotle and perhaps ever since that early unremembered dawn, the problem of the socially directed rule and the
individuated set of facts has been accommodated through the device
of equitable lawmaking by judges.
This is by no means a universally accepted approach to the problem. Many have challenged equitable lawmaking in the construction
of statutes. Some have doubted its very existence. And where its existence has been acknowledged, its death has been sought with frequency and vigor. Henry Campbell Black wrote its epitaph a century
ago.' 5 It has been held to be in violation of our various state and
federal constitutional separation-of-powers provisions.' 6 Court after
court has paid lip service to its demise. And yet this phoenix rises. 1
Why?
THE GREEKS

Eugene O'Neill once wrote: "There is no present or future-only
the past happening over and over again-now."1 8 Perhaps no civilization has given witness to the accuracy of that observation to such a
degree as has that of the Golden Age of Greece. Inevitably we strike
out on new philosophic, psychological, or political pathways only to
find that that uniquely prescient civilization has trodden those paths
before us.' 9 And so it is with the concept of equitable lawmaking in
the construing of statutes. The Greeks not only thought about it, but
divided into intellectual camps over it-one camp representing a
quite modern positivist approach to the phenomenon, the other a
quite modem natural-law approach.
15. "The right to apply an equitable construction to the written laws was often adverted to as one to be exercised with caution, on account of the danger of turning the
courts into legislatures, and in modem times it has been disavowed by them, and Its
principle distinctly repudiated." H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAws 62 (2d ed. 1911).

16. Id. at 57-66. See also J. LEwiS, SUTHERLAND: STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 1077 (2d ed. 1904).
17. Sagacious legal scholars of high repute, such as, for instance, John Chipman
Gray, Wigmore, Allen and Radin, have said that courts, in discharging their
duty of carrying out the express will of the legislature as faithfully as they can,
are frequently unable to escape the responsibility of engaging in supplemental
legislation.
Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 621 (2d Cir. 1944) (Frank, J.). See also Southern Pac.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
18. E. O'NEILL, A MOON FOR THE MISBEGOTTEN (1952).
19.

As an

example, perhaps

the

newest

and

most

original approach

to legal

philosophy is that of the Freudian, or more accurately, psychoanalytic school. See, e.g.,
A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 3. Ehrenzweig unhesitatingly acknowledged the debt of

the school to classical Greek jurisprudence.
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We are told that the Athenians were an inordinately litigious
people, 20 and the dilemma of the statute applicable on its face but
unjust in its application must have been known to them. Indeed,
Plutarch said that Solon deliberately worded his laws obscurely so as
to increase the power of the Athenian judges. 21 Accordingly, the
Greek advocates, "[i]n arguing from statutory enactments [made]
much play .
with the supposed intention of Solon as the most
revered lawgiver of Athens." 22 Paying lip service to legislative intent,
a phenomenon solidly engrafted on to our own jurisprudence, thus
characterized the Athenian approach to statutory application by
judges.23
Plato had no difficulty in recognizing the problem, although he
did little to solve it. It was, in fact, a necessary part of his theory of
ideas. 2A In his view, only the idea of law or justice was truly real.
Positive law as written by mortal men was merely a pale and often
imperfect representation of that idea. Consequently positive law and
justice sometimes conflicted. That conflict, in Plato's view, was caused
by legislators' imperfect interpretation of the idea of justice. Perhaps the clearest statement by Plato concerning the problem of the
socially directed rule and the individuated set of facts appeared in The
Statesman:
[T]he law does not perfectly comprehend what is noblest
and most just for all and therefore cannot enforce what is
best. The differences of men and actions, and the endless
20. See ARISTOPHANES, THE BIRDS, in which the character Euripides quips: "Grasshoppers chirp upon their boughs a month or two, but our Athenians chirp over their
lawsuits their whole life long." Quoted in R. BONNER, LAVYERS AND LITIGANTS IN
ANCIENT ATHENS 96 (1927).
21. J. JONES, THE LAw AND LEGAL THEORY OF THE GREEKS 300 n.3 (1956).
22. Id. at 302.
23. Id. at 65, 302. See ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, bk. I, ch. 13. at 80-81 (Modern Library
ed. 1954).
24. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, bk. VII.
25. Carl Joachim Friedrich noted the similarity of Plato's view to the approach of the
natural-law jurists, but also perceived the difference. In Plato's view, positive law participates in the idea of justice; the natural-law jurists, according to Friedrich. see positive law merely as the lesser of two norms, with justice as the greater.
It follows that [according to Plato] positive law is a phenomenon, exposed to
becoming and passing away, which participates only incompletely in the timeless world of ideas, a notion very different from that of natural law in modern
idealism, where the ideal of justice as the more perfect norm is confronted with

the positive law.
C. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

1963).

17-18 (2d ed.
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irregular movements of human things do not admit of any
universal and simple rule. And no art whatsoever can lay
26
down a rule which will last for all time.
Plato's resolution of the problem-some would call it "pessimistic"
and others "realistic"-is presaged, perhaps, in Socrates' decision in
The Crito to obey an unjust "law" and drink the poison. Strangely,
Plato recognized the possibility by hypothesis of solving the problem
by the use of equitable lawmaking. In The Statesman, Socrates was
seen as agreeing with the proposition that government officials who
acted contrary to the written laws "with a view to something better,
would be acting . . . like the true Statesman."2 7 But Plato went on
to portray Socrates as agreeing that, because no great number of
men are able to acquire a good enough knowledge of the art of lawmaking, the best approach "is to do nothing contrary to . . . written
laws .. "28 Indeed, Plato seemed to foresee the propensity of some
governmental systems to entrust the problem to judges, and he recognized a further, perhaps more serious problem in that course of
action: not every guardian of the law acts out of pure motives.
But what if, while compelling all these operations to be regulated by written law, we were to appoint as the guardian of
the laws someone elected by a show of hands or by lot, and
he, caring nothing about the written text, should proceed to
act contrary to it from motives of interest or favour, and
without any claim to knowledge, would not this be a still
worse evil than the former?29
Thus Plato's final position leaves us ill at ease. He insisted, in
natural-law fashion, that laws which do not serve the general good of
the community are not true laws, 30 but he did not take the bait and
create a theoretical approach for equitable lawmaking by judges.
Aristotle did advocate equitable lawmaking in the construing of
statutes. It was he who gave a name to that missing ingredient in
some applications of statute law, the ingredient which judges must
supply: epieikeia, a word which, thanks to the predilection of me26. PLATO, THE STATESMAN, in 3 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 509 (4th ed. B. Jowett
ed. 1964).
27. Id. at 516.
28. Id. at 517.
29. Id. at 516.
30. C. FRIEDRICH, supra note 25, at 19.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

1978]

dieval translators for transliterating instead of translating, has entered
Anglo-American jurisprudence. Aristotle summarized his solution to
the problem in an oft-quoted passage from his Nichomiachean Ethics:
[A]II law is universal, but there are some things about which
it is not possible to speak correctly in universal terms. Now
in situations where it is necessary to speak in universal
terms but impossible to do so correctly, the law takes the
majority of cases, fully realizing in what respect it misses the
mark. The law itself is none the less correct. For the mistake lies neither in the law nor in the lawgiver, but in the
nature of the case. For such is the material of which actions
are made. So'in a situation in which the law speaks universally, but the case at issue happens to fall outside the universal formula, it is correct to rectify the shortcoming, in
other words, the omission and mistake of the lawgiver due
to the generality of the statement. Such a rectification corresponds to what the lawgiver himself would have said if he
were present, and what he would have enacted if he had
known [of this particular case]. 31
Thus Aristotle was in accord with Plato in recognizing that human
fallibility lay at the core of the problem. 32 His solution, however,
went far beyond Plato's reticence and well into what it would not be
inaccurate to call the conventional wisdom of today. Courts, when
faced with the hard case, i.e., the case in which the law covers a
particular set of facts but in justice ought not to do so, or in which
the law does not cover a particular set of facts but in justice ought to,
should place themselves in the shoes of the legislator and do what the
legislator would have done had he or she known of the present case.
In other words, courts should legislate equitably.
Despite its advocacy of equitable lawmaking, Aristotle's position
is not the radical departure from Plato's that it appears on its face to
be. Aristotle connected judicial lawmaking with legislative intent. For
Aristotle, the equitable view of a case should in no way contradict
legislative intent. 33 This would accord with Plato's approach of giving
31.
1962).
32.
33.

ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHics bk. 5, h. 10, at 14142 (m. Ostwald trans.
See also ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, supra note 23, at 80.
See J. JONES, supra note 21, at 66.
Id. at 65. In the RHETomc, bk. I, ch. 13, Aristotle observed that equity is in-

tended by the legislator whenever the legislator is aware of the necessity to draft a law
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legislative intent its due in the final analysis. But Aristotle recognized
elsewhere that an equitable view cannot be presumed to have been
intended by the legislator when the legislator has neglected to notice
a defect in the law. 34 It is therefore open to conjecture how closely

the judge must observe some presumed legislative intent under Aristotle's approach.
The question was similarly left open in Athenian practice. On the
one hand, even in the "hard case" the words of the statute were
supposed to control the judges' decision. But at the same time the
oath of Athenian judges permitted them to decide according to their
own best judgment whenever there was no applicable statutory law.
That power came to be used in quite modem fashion not merely in
the absence of statutory law but in the presence of an applicable but
35
unjust or inequitable statute.
Recognizing the propriety of equitable lawmaking by judges
leads, of course, to practical difficulties. The sense of equity of some
judges may not be in accord with the true legislative intent, or may
be ruled by irrelevant passions or inexcusable biases. Noel Dermot
O'Donoghue found a solution to that dilemma elsewhere in Aristotle's
Nichomachean Ethics.36 In this modified view of Aristotle, legal
technique alone does not suffice. Moral virtue must at some point
enter into the judge's approach. We may credit O'Donoghue with
seeing that necessary connection in his joining of Aristotle's gnom6
with Aristotle's epieikeia: "gnom=6 belongs to the head and Epikeia
[sic] to the heart, and . . . together they describe the type of judge

who is at once shrewd and humane, who knows the law but also
knows how to apply the law to the case in hand." 3" Gnom=6 has been
translated as "good sense," and may be equated both with the good
judgment and sound understanding of the intellect and also with the
forgiveness and sympathetic understanding of the heart. 38 The conclusion seems inexorable that equitable construction as a legal
technique is an insufficient solution to the problem of the generalized
rule of law and the individuated set of facts. A rigid set of absolute
rules, absolutely interpreted, invites individual injustices. But unin general terms. In that sense a court engaging in equitable lawmaking is giving effect
to legislative intent.
34. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, supra note 23, at 80.
35. J. JONES, supra note 21, at 135.
36. O'Donoghue, The Law Beyond the Law, 18 AM. J. JuRIs. 150 (1973).
37. Id. at 154.
38. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 31, at 165 n.47.
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checked epieikeia reduces all law to an unwieldy and paralyzing form
of situationism. Gnom is Aristotle's restraint on epieikeia.

If Aristotle expressed the modem-day candor in acknowledging
the existence and even advocating the use of equitable lawmaking by

judges, Epicurus expressed the modem-day discomfort with the notion. If one accepts the premise that natural-law jurisprudence views
a law as valid only insofar as it is in conformity with principles flowing
from the nature of human beings, then Epicurus can properly be described as a natural-law jurist. But the main thrust of Epicurus' legal
philosophy is best described as utilitarian. The ambivalence, while a
curiosity, is not inexplicable. In Epicurus' view, law originates from

human nature, but human nature itself is dynamic, even evolutionary. Consequently "usefulness" to the developing human condition

is a "natural principle" and the criterion for judging the justness of
laws. 39 It is in the context of this "natural-law utilitarianism" that

Epicurus and the Epicureans confronted the question of equitable
lawmaking by judges. Let us suppose a particular statute does not

serve, and in fact runs counter to, this natural principle of usefulness
to human kind. Must it be obeyed? Both Epicurus40 and his followers
answered the question, surprisingly, in the affirmative. Indeed, one

Epicurean's answer to the problem posed by the state which demands
that we obey an unjust law was, in essence, "love it or leave it."4 1

The ancient Greeks thus presaged most aspects of our modem
approach to the problem of the socially directed rule and the indi39. Chroust, The Philosophy of Law of Epicurus and the Epicureans, 16 AM. J.
Juims. 36, 42 (1972).
Only to the extent to which they serve the "natural principle" of usefulness
may the laws or the acknowledged rights and duties be called "just." Any law
that fails to live up to this basic criterion is contrary to the dictates of nature
[B]y confronting the "positive laws" with the "natural princiand reason ....
ple" of usefulness and expediency, Epicurus and the Epicureans, in their own
particular fashion, raise the old and apparently never to be settled confrontation
of natural law and positive law, or to be more exact, touch upon the age-old
problem dealing with the validation and justification of the positive law through
natural law.
Id. at 58-59.
40. Id. at 66-67.
41.

Philodemus is also fully aware of the fact that the ...

"statutory laws" ...

are not always in complete accord with the "natural laws" ... or with the "laws
common to all civilized peoples" . . . and commonly observed by all civilized
nations. Nevertheless, he insists, we must abide by these "particular laws," although we may not always consider them to be just and fair, or else simply
leave the country.
Id. at 80.
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viduated set of facts. Plato framed the question in terms of the human
fallibility of the legislator. 42 Aristotle both recognized the phenomenon and advocated the use of equitable lawmaking by judges as a
response to the problem. 43 Epicurus and his followers saw the potential problem in any jurisdiction which accepts a natural-law approach
to jurisprudence, and dismissed it by adopting a positivist's respect
for the statutory language. 44
THE ROMAN

WAY

All these views roiled and jostled in the busy jurisprudence of
late classical Rome. 45 But there was one peculiarly Roman ingredient
which flavored the stew of equitable lawmaking, the recipe for which
is in use today: 4 6 interpretatio.

Many writers have been tempted to treat the Code of Justinian
as a starting point but it was, in truth, the crowning achievement of a
system of jurisprudence which was, at its writing, centuries older
than the common-law system is today. It is in the pre-Justinian era,
"[t]he period in which Roman private law reached its highest development," and it was in "the so-called classical period of Rome," 47
that we find evidences of a widespread use of the techniques of
equitable lawmaking.
The fountainhead of all Roman law prior to the Code of Justinian
was the Twelve Tables, a codification which preceded Justinian's by a
millenium. Between 150 B.C. and A.D. 235 there existed a difficultto-define yet nonetheless influential group of persons, the Roman
Jurists. They held no office and possessed no delegated governmental
power, but they were responsible for most of the sophisticated
Roman law in their era. 48 Building upon Plato's recognition of the
problem of the hard case, i.e., the casus omissus, and upon Aristotle's
advocacy of equitable lawmaking as a solution, the Roman Jurists institutionalized the practice into a process of lawmaking by analogy.
A. Arthur Schiller described it thus: "Simply stated, from a given rule
of law the major premise which it presupposed was ascertained; as a
42. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
43. See text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
44. See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
45. See Schiller, Roman Interpretatio and Anglo-American Interpretation and Con.
struction, 27 VA. L. REV. 733 (1941).
46. See, e.g., Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F.2d 434, 439-40, 441 n.16 (2d Cir. 1949).
47. Schiller, supra note 45, at 734 & n.7.
48. Id. at 734-35.
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logical consequence a series of other rules was derived, not directly
contained within the source from which the proposition stemmed."4 9
The residue of this form of equitable construction, i.e., lawmaking by
analogy, permeates modem civil lav jurisprudence, and is far from
unknown in contemporary Anglo-American cases.50 It of course runs
counter to the conventional Anglo-American wisdom embodied in the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (as it no doubt did in the

Roman era whence the maxim is derived). Roman interpretatio and
its modem descendants in the civil law did, and still do, involve true
law making by judges, not merely the passive effectuation of legislative intent. 5 '
Perhaps no person before or since has framed the issue facing
natural-law jurists concerned with statutory construction as lucidly as
the eclectic rhetor Cicero:
True law is right reason conformable to nature, universal,
unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty,
and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil. Whether it enjoins or forbids, the good respect its injunctions, and the
wicked treat them with indifference. This law cannot be
49. Id. at 738 (emphasis added). See also Kiss, Equity and Law, in SCIENCE OF
LEGAL METHOD 146, 149 (1917).

50. Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F.2d 434, 439-41 & nn.14 & 16 (2d Cir. 1949). Most
civil law jurisdictions legislatively recognize lawmaking by analogy. See, ,.g.,
the Italian Civil Code of 1942: "If a controversy cannot be decided by a precise provision, consideration is given to provisions that regulate similar cases or analogous matters .... Quoted in J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 45 (1959).

51. [T]here is a difference between the extensive interpretation which attempts
to discern the intent of the legislator as it can be derived from the scope of the
law, and the analogy of a statute which establishes new law because of the
similarity of the reason without regard to the intent of the legislator. . . .
[T]here seems to be a determined effort in recent times to accord to the courts
the same power of analogical reasoning from statute that has always been
employed with regard to cases.
Schiller, Roman Interpretatio, supra note 45, at 740 (citing Statutes and The Sources of
Law, in HARvARD LEGAL EssAYS 229-33 (1934)).

[T]he older art paid little attention to the meaning of the words of the statutes
•..and used them primarily as pegs upon which to hang a new development in
the law ....
Aristotle... says "it is equitable to look not to the law but to the legislator,
not to the letter of the law but to the intention of the legislator." The Latin
rhetors not only adopt aequitas as the basic principle of their method of interpretation, but seem to go beyond the Greeks in stressing the existence of
aequitasas a body of law alongside of ius.
Id. at 749, 757. See also Kiss, supra note 49, at 149.
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contradicted by any other law, and is not liable to either
derogation or abrogation. Neither the senate nor the people
can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal
law of justice. It needs no other expositor and interpreter
than our own conscience. It is not one thing at Rome, and another at Athens; one thing today, and another tomorrow; but
in all times and nations this universal law must for ever [sic]
reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the sovereign master
and emperor of all beings. God himself is its author, its
promulgator, its enforcer. And he who does not obey it flies
from himself, and does violence to the very nature of man.5 2
Cicero, of course, was speaking in the context of one's individual
moral obligation to obey or disobey the unjust law. But what if the
same dilemma were posed to the interpreter or applier of the unjust
statute-the judge? Would the judge give effect to the statute or to
the higher, unwritten law? We saw that Epicurus, reverencing both,
opted for the statute. 53 But what would a Roman judge or interpreter
have done? Schiller has separated Cicero and his fellow rhetors from
the jurists, na implying that the concept of a higher law, or aequitas,
espoused by the rhetors never did enter the nuts-and-bolts judging of
cases by jurists. It may be that the Roman jurists did confine themselves to the simpler "hard-case" concept of equitable lawmaking, and
did not recognize Cicero's concept of the higher law. But Cicero's
concept did develop a place in Roman jurisprudence in the prerogative of the emperor himself to mediate between law and equity, a
prerogative which came to be known among canonists and civilians as
"authentic interpretation": "By a constitution of Constantine, interpretatio, now spoken of as the mediator between law (ius) and equity
(aequitas), is reserved to the emperor alone; the jurists have passed
out of the picture." 55
The interpretative function of the jurists thus died out, superseded by the imperial prerogative, and indeed was specifically prohibited by Justinian on publication of the Corpus Juris Civilis. 56 But
52. M. CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH, bk. III, ch. 22, reprinted in TIE
NATURAL LAW READER, supra note 9, at 54-55 (emphasis added).
53. See text accompanying note 41 supra. Socrates would have been in accord, basing the obligation to obey the statute on a natural-law principle of social preservation.
See Hogan, The Conscience of the Law, 21 CATH. LAw. 190 (1975).
54. Schiller, Roman Interpretatio, supra note 45, at 753 et seq.
55. Id. at 744.
56. J. MERRYMAN, supra note 50, at 8.
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the classical jurists did succeed, before the demise of their influence,
in building upon 57 and institutionalizing within Roman lav earlier
Greek thought concerning equitable lawmaking in the construing of
statutes.
AQUINAS

Try as he might, Justinian could not stamp out the flickers of

equitable construction by judges. By the eleventh century it was
flourishing again as a legal concept among the great writers of the law
school at Bologna. We are told that the school's founder, Irnerius, in
his Summa Codicis "clearly lays it dovn that laws which are contrary
to equity are not to be enforced by the judge."58 The intensity of the
medieval jurists' advocacy of equitable construction (indeed it goes
beyond mere advocacy; it is a mandate to judges) can easily be understood in light of their definition of equity, or aequitas. "Aequitas"
to the writers of the law school at Bologna, and doubtless to those
legal scholars who preceded and influenced them, is God Himself.59
Bulgarus, a successor to Irnerius at the school in Bologna, started with
this assumption when he urged that jurists "must always consider
carefully whether any particular law (jus statuturn) is equitable, if
57.

See Schiller, Jurists' Law, supra note 10, at 1228 n.6.

58.

2 R. CARLYLE & A. CARLYLE, A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEORY IN

THE WEST 15 (1950). Irerius had written:
Conditae leges intelligendae sunt benignius ut mens earum servetur et ne ab
equitate discrepent: legitima enim praecepta tune demum a judice admittuntur,
cum ad equitatis rationem accommodantur. Item in legibus intelligendis ne qua
fraus adhibeatur, vitandum est....
Written laws are more richly understood when one pays heed to the insight
they possess, and not when they are read out of harmony and equity. For it is
only when the written laws are adjusted to the principle of equity that the true
legal rules can be gleaned from them by the judge. And so it is that in interpreting laws one must avoid whatever might lead to error.
SUNMA CODICIS, bk. I, ch. 14, quoted in id. at 15 n.1 [translation by author].
59. 2 R. CARLYLE & A. CARLYLE, supra note 58, at 7-8.
Aequitas est rerum convenientia quae in paribus causis paria jura desiderat.
Item Deus, qui secundum hoe quod desiderat aequitas dicitun nihil aliud est
aequitas quam Deus....
Equity is a harmony of nature which demands that similar cases be adjudged by
similar legal principles. In like manner, God who is the source of this demand,
has been called equity. Equity is nothing other than Cod Himself.
FRAGMENTrM PRAEGENSE (anonymous), bk. IN', ch. 2, quoted in id.at 8 n.1 [translation by author]. This view, in content and possibly in source, is Augustinean. Saint
Augustine acknowledged that human law must give way to the lex aeterna which he
identified with the Divine Intellect and Will of Cod. See Chroust, The Fundamental
Ideas in St. Augustine's Philosophy of Law, 18 Am. J.Jums. 57, 61-62 (1973).
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not it must be abolished. The judge must prefer equity to strict law
-60 Not all the Bolognese civilians were as dogmatic as Imerius

....

and Bulgarus, however, on the mandate to judges to use equitable
construction. Some, no doubt writing with knowledge of the constitution of Constantine referred to above, 6 1 would reserve all cases involving a divergence between law and equity to the authentic interpretation of the emperor. 62 One might surmise that the difference
in positions could be ascribed to whether one identified equity with
God or one had a more technical, more human definition of the
3
6

term.

Despite their lack of unanimity, the early medieval civilians did,
much more clearly than the Greeks and Romans, find the source of
equitable construction in God. It was left to the later Scholiastics,
most notably Saint Thomas Aquinas, to weave the inconsistent approaches of the jurists, the rhetors, the imperial prerogative, and the
various Bolognan civilians into a blended tapestry, which stood for
five centuries as natural-law jurisprudence, the dominant legal theory
of the West. 6 4 The fundamental problem of natural-law jurisprudence

is to draw a connection between God, equitable construction, and
moral virtue. If equitable construction is merely a technique for ascertaining true legislative intent in the necessary generality of statutory rules, how was it then that Aristotle saw a connection between
equitable construction and moral virtue?6 5 How was it that the early
medieval civilians drew a connection between equitable construction
and God Himself?66 What do God and moral virtue have to do with
the equitable construction of statutes?
It has been said that Saint Thomas Aquinas' explanation of the
nature of equitable construction was "radically identical" with that of
Aristotle. 6 7 Aquinas clearly saw epieikeia, even in the civil law setting, as an outgrowth of the necessary generality of statutory rules:
60.

2 R. CARLYLE & A. CARLYLE, supra note 58, at 15.

61. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
62. 2 R. CARLYLE & A. CARLYLE, supra note 58, at 16.
63. Id. at 16-17.
64. Other Scholiastic philosophers addressed the problem of equitable construction.
Summaries of the thoughts of St. Albert the Great, John Gerson, St. Antoninus, Cajetan,
Soto, Covarruvias, Medina, Navarrus, Vasquez, and Francisco Suarez on epicikeia can be
found in L. RILEY, THE HISTORY, NATURE AND USE OF EPIKEIA IN MORAL THEOLOGY
19-102 (1948).
65. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
66. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
67. L. RILEY, supra note 64, at 28.
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Now it happens often that the observance of some point of
law conduces to the common weal in the majority of instances, and yet, in some cases, is very hurtful. Since then
the lawgiver cannot have in view every single case, he
shapes the law according to what happens most frequently,
by directing his attention to the common good. Wherefore if
a case arise wherein the observance of that law would be
hurtful to the general welfare, it should not be observed. 68
Although he recognized the primacy of legislative intent over legislative language, 69 Aquinas did not, like Aristotle, view the search for a
speculative legislative intent as the proper technique of equitable
construction: "In these and like cases it is bad to follow the law, and
it is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates
of justice and the common good."70 Aquinas' brand of equitable construction would thus seem to involve the judge in a larger measure of
law making than Aristotle's. This is certainly true in practice. But in
Aquinas' legal theory, the process is more one of discovering the law
than making the law. For in the Thomistic, as in the Augustinean
scheme of things, a human law which is unjust is no law at all. It is a
perversion of law. 71 What, then, is the judge's job? When the judge
is faced with a human law which is unjust in its application to the
particular set of facts, he or she must ignore the human law and apply
the law of nature, 72 which is "the light of natural reason." 73 Drawing
on Sacred Scripture, Aquinas defined the light of natural reason as
' 74
"nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light."

68.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW 103 (Gateway ed. 1977).

69. "He who follows the intention of the lawgiver, does not interpret the law simply;
but in a case in which it is evident, by reason of the manifest harm. that the lawgiver
intended otherwise." Id. at 104.
70. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE "SuMMA THEOLOGICA," pt. II, Second Part, ques.
120, art. 1, at 169 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans. 1922) (emphasis

added).
71. As Augustine says ....
that which is not just seems to be no lawr at all;
wherefore the force of a lav depends on the extent of its justice.... [11f at any
point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of
lav.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATIsE, supra note 68, at 78 (emphasis added).

72. "[I]n human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the
rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature ....
Id.
73. Id. at 15.
74. Id. at 15-16. "It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the
rational creature's participation of the eternal law." Id. at 16.
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Thus Aquinas assimilated equitable construction into his naturallaw jurisprudence, raising it from a troublesome but necessary
technique for handling the hard case to a principle of higher justice, a
law beyond the law. Noel Dermot O'Donoghue wrote of Aquinas'
treatment of equitable construction:
What we are glimpsing here, it seems to me, is some
kind of ultimate order of right and wrong which can only be
apprehended by a kind of intellectual intuition. .

.

. Essen-

tially it is an intuition of the human, of man's needs, possibilities, and fragility. There is a sense in which the law is
inhuman, but the law beyond the law is entirely human, and
the judge who takes account of it is simply thinking in
human terms as well as legal terms. This does not mean that
he becomes a moralist, for he cannot judge the human heart
... . But he can judge the human situation as a human
situation, and here his intuition of what it is to be human is
uniquely important. The law beyond the law is simply the
law of his own humanness, an intuition of the human in
himself which demands great lucidity and humility. 75
Modern legal realists, such as Holmes and Frank, would no doubt be
surprised to learn the extent of coincidence between their views of
judicial lawmaking and those of Aquinas .76
EQUITY IN ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE

Perhaps Aquinas best articulated the real significance and true
import of equity in statutory construction. Equity was needed in any
scheme of statutory construction not only to relieve the difficulty of
the hard, unforeseen case, but also to provide a means of recognizing
higher law concepts which, if justice is to rule, must at times control
over literal language. This elevated concept of equitable lawmaking in
the construing of statutes found its way to English shores in the work
of Christopher St. Germain. 77
75. O'Donoghue, supra note 36, at 163-64.
76. See, e.g., Jerome Frank's description of the role of a judge: "A judge with an
imaginative personality supplies 'an increment of vitality that is . . . desirable .. .and
truly necessary in order to put' the legislative 'message across,' for only such a judge
can read a statute 'with an insight which transcends its literal meaning.' " J. FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL 300 (1949).
77. Called "St. German" by Plucknett & Barton in the Selden Society edition of

Doctor and Student, but "St. Germain" generally elsewhere.
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In 1523 St. Germain began publishing his set of dialogues which
eventually became the very influential work Doctor and Student.78 In
part, Doctor and Student was an apology for the application of English law in opposition to Church decrees. St. Germain set out to
demonstrate that the common lav rather than Church decrees should
govern the consciences of Englishmen, 79 a heady idea in preReformation England. What if English law conflicted with the law of
God or the law of nature? How could it ever be considered the
superior binding force on English consciences? The AristotelianThomist view of epieikeia80 provided an answer. There is, or ought to
be, thought St. Germain, a measure of the law of God and the law of
nature in every human law, and human laws which seem to conflict
with those higher laws ought to be interpreted in such a way as to
respect the higher law. The usual method of resolving any such conflict was, according to St. Germain, the Aristotelian method of construing into the law a dispensation or exception for the hard case. 81
Epieikeia, in St. Germain's view, resides in every statute, and
can be found there by proper interpretative techniques:
Equity is a righteousness that considereth all the particular
circumstances of the deed [and that] also is tempered with
the sweetness of mercy. And such an equity must always be
observed in every law of man and in every general rule
thereof, and that knew he well who said thus. Laws covet to
be ruled by equity. . . . [Equity's exception] is secretly
un82
derstood in every general rule of every positive law.
Equity resides in every statute because the law of reason and the law
of God is the soul of every statute:
The law of man which sometimes is called law positive
is derived by reason as a thing which is necessarily and
probably flowing of the law of reason and the law of God, for
the due end of human nature. . . . In every law positive
well made is somewhat of the law of reason and of the law of
83
God.
78.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

C. ST. GERMAN, DocToR AND STUDENT (T. Plucknett & J. Barton eds. 1974).
Id. at xlvi.
Or as St. Germain transliterated Aristotle: opicaia. Id. at 97.
Id. at 95 et seq.
Id. at 95, 97 (spelling modernized).
Id. at 27 (spelling modernized).
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If equity and the higher law concepts were understood as residing
dormant in every human law, then the proposition that human laws
bind human consciences would be intellectually defensible. The hard
case and the law whose application works an outrage on the human

conscience would still be manageable because courts could relieve the
harshness or injustice by plucking the epieikeia from the law and applying it in place of the literal language.
St. Germain's view of equitable construction, or at least the Aristotelian hard-case-exception part of his view, took hold in English
jurisprudence in the commentaries accompanying Edmund Plowden's
case reports. Plowden seemed to see equity as both resident in the
statute itself and as a virtue (Aristotle's gnom?) apart from it:
[T]he law may be resembled to a nut, which has a shell and
a kernel within, the letter of the law represents the shell,
and the sense of it the kernel. . . . And experience shows
us that no lawmakers can foresee all things which may happen, and therefore it is fit that if there is any defect in the
law, it should be reformed by equity, which is no part of the
84
law, but a moral virtue which corrects the law.
St. Germain's view, with one small refinement added by Edward
Hake, survived as the dominant approach in Anglo-American jurisprudence. But we have already seen that modern Anglo-American
theorists eschew equitable construction, because they are too aware
of the dangers of equitable lawmaking by judges. Plato alerted us to
this problem.8 5 It is, after all, human beings and not the Ultimate
Sovereign who must delve for equity in a statute, and men are fallible. It is the human inability to draft perfect laws 6 which makes
epieikeia necessary. Is the end result a vicious circle?
If Edward Hake did not resolve the dilemma, he at least provided a theoretical justification for our contemporary approach. Hake
wrote his dialogue, called Epieikeia, in the late 1580's or early
1590's.87 He not only saw the dangers of partiality and error that
84. Eyston v. Studd, 75 Eng. Rep. [2 Plowden] 688, 695, 698 (1574) (citing, inter alial,
C. St Germain, Doctor and Student). Plowden likened resident equity to the soul of a

statute, its words being likened to its body, and went on to observe that "this correction
of the general words is much used in the law of England." Id. at 695-96.
85. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
86. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
87. Thorne, Preface to E. HAKE, EPIEIKEIA: A DIALOGUE ON EQUITY IN THREE
PARTS at xi-xii (D. Yale ed. 1953).

1978]

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Plato had pointed out 8 but tried to create an approach which would
obviate those dangers. Hake's idea was to build an approach to statutory construction on St. Germain's notion that equity resided in every
statute:89
[W]hereas Equity is said to be . . . that saying is not so to

be understood as though Equity were a thing out of the law
or beside the law, or as if it were the Equity of the judge,
and not of the law, but that the Equity thereby meant is to
be taken (as it is indeed) to be within the law, and that it
being there found is to be applied by the judge of the law
according as the particularity of the case that is before him,
not aided by the letter of the law, shall require.90
Whereas St. Germain identified the equity that resided in a statute
with the law of nature and the law of God, 91 and that identification
seemed to give judges the license to surmise what the law of nature
or the law of God might be in the particular situation, Hake, building
on Plowden, identified his own concept of resident equity with the
intent of the law:
[I]f [it] should happen that there were a case which being
brought to the words of the law were likely to receive rule
or judgment contrary to the law of God, against the law of
Reason, what else could the judge conceive in such a case
but that, while he should stick in the letter of the law, he
should but insist in the very husk and skin of the law, and
88. [I]t is a thing most dangerous that judges should be left to the liberty of their
own exposition of the law.
". [W]here the law is any way left to the discretion of the judge it is either
for that the judge has authority above the law (as to alter the law at his discretion) or else that in the exposition of the law he has power to use or not to use
Equity according to his discretion.
E. HAKE,supra note 87, at 25, 43 (spelling modernized).
t...rare eaution of Hake's
89. Samuel E. Thorne, who wrote the prelace to Uie u
Epieikeia is of the view that St. Germain, along with Plowden, did not recognize
epieikeia as residing in the law itself, and he credits Hake with departing from St. Germain in finding epieikeia in the law. Thome, Preface to E. HAKE, supra note 87, at
viii, X.
90. E. HAKE, supra note 87, at 46 (emphasis and parentheses in original; spelling
modernized).
91. "[E]picaia ...is no other thing but an exception of the law of god, or of the law
of reason, from the general rules of the law of man [spelling modernized]." C. ST. GERmAN, supra note 78, at 97.
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were therefore to turn himself by and by to investigate the
92
intent and hidden meaning of the law?
Thus, in Hake's view it is neither the objective law of God or law of
reason nor the judge's own conception of the law of God or law of
reason that controls in statutory interpretation. The controlling principle is the result of the judge's investigation into the intent and hidden meaning of the law itself-the purpose behind the law. When we
recall that both Plato and Aristotle advocated giving legislative intent
its due in equitable construction, 93 we see that Hake has taken us full
circle. But Aristotle took us one step beyond a quest-for-legislativeintent approach when he recognized that an equitable view cannot
always be presumed to have been intended by the legislator. 94 Did
Hake take that step as well?
What is a judge to do when neither the law itself nor its equity
(i.e., the evidences of its purposes, intent, or spirit) resolves the ambiguity? What is a judge to do when neither the law nor its equity
removes the perceived injustice? Both questions face judges today.
Hake's solution was for the judge to refer the matter to the legislature
for authentic interpretation or a new law:
If the letter of the law at any time does happen to fail in the
deciding of a particularity, the judge or expositor of the law
is thereupon by and by to investigate the hidden sense or
Equity thereof. .

.

. Again, if as well the letter as the in-

terpretation thereof (whereby I understand the law in his
fullness) shall also happen to fail or be defective, then the
only way is to fly unto the supreme authority for the supply
95
of a new law.
Hake's approach thus closed the door on the idea of judicial lawmaking in the construing of statutes. The theoretical basis which he provided for his approach, a "purpose" approach which let itself be
guided by the spirit and reason behind the rule, was receiving contemporaneous practical attention in the courts with the rule in
Heydon's Case. 96 Thus it was that Anglo-American jurisprudence
92. E. HAKE, supra note 87, at 16 (emphasis added; spelling modernized). Hake's
identification of equity with legislative intent found its way into practical jurisprudence.
See, e.g., R. v. Williams, 96 Eng. Rep. 51, 52 (1758) (Lord Mansfield).
93. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
94. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
95. E. HAKE, supra note 87, at 23 (emphasis in original; spelling modernized).
96. 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. 1584).
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reached its present accommodation with the dilemma of the general
rule of law and the particular set of facts, an accommodation tolerable
but in truth no less fleeting than that reached by the Greeks.
It cannot be doubted that Hake's emphasis on legislative intent
has emerged today as the dominant characteristic of Anglo-American
statutory interpretation. Similarly the introjection of legislative intent
into the old process of equitably construing statutes is what led to the
ostensible demise of that process and the rise of the spirit-and-reason
or purpose approach. The distinction between equitable construction
and construing in accord with the spirit and reason of a law is a delicate one, but one which saves the latter approach from charges of
abuse of judicial discretion and usurpation of legislative power. When
a judge applies his or her own sense of equity or his or her own sense
of natural or divine justice, the judge is making law, or so say the
critics of equitable construction. 97 But the spirit and reason approach
evades their criticism, for "the intention of the legislature constitutes
the law of its enactments." 98
THE PHOENIX RISES

The accomplishment of Edward Hake in bringing about the
metamorphosis of equitable construction into the spirit-and-reason
rule had a settling effect on Anglo-American jurisprudence-for a
time. The troublesome little gremlin of equitable lawmaking by
judges had been at last imprisoned. Judges, of course, went right on
equitably making law in their construing of statutes, 99 happily insulating themselves from charges of usurpation by giving the credit to
what must have been extremely prescient legislatures.
Someone had to blow the whistle on what was, in more and
more instances, a pure fiction. As we have seen, the need for equitable lawmaking by judges rested, at least partially,' 00 on the fact that
legislatures neglect to have any intent whatsoever with respect to this

97. See, e.g., C. SANDS, 2A SUTHERLAND: STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNSTRUcTION § 54.02 at 353 & n.3 (1973).

98.
99.

E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 178 at 292 (1940).
See C. SANDS, supra note 97, at § 54.03. "lilt is easily seen that the courts still

follow the same process in the interpretation of statutes, although they may generally
disapprove the doctrine of equitable construction. . . .Even though by name tle doctrine may be refused application, actually it is still used." E. CRAWFORD, supra note 98,
§ 179 at 298.
100. I.e., in the Aristotelian hard-case view. In other parts it rested on the naturallaw approach. See text accompanying notes 67-83 supra.
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or that then unforeseen particularity. Aristotle had, of course, blown
the whistle millenia ago.'10 But it was left to the American realists, as
the natural-law jurists had done in an earlier age, to once again release the gremlin of equitable lawmaking by judges:
Interpretation is generally spoken of as if its chief function
was to discover what the meaning of the Legislature really
was. But when a Legislature has had a real intention, one
way or another, on a point, it is not once in a hundred times
that any doubt arises as to what its intention was. If that
were all that a judge had to do with the statute, interpretation of statutes, instead of being one of the most difficult of a
judge's duties, would be extremely easy. The fact is that the
difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the Legislature has had no meaning at all; when the question which is
raised on the statute never occurred to it; when what the
judges have to do is, not to determine what the Legislature
did mean on a point which was present to its mind, but to
guess what it would have intended on a point not present to
its mind, if the point had been present. 10 2
That echo of Aristotle, written
reechoed with varied volume
Holmes, 10 3 Jerome Frank,' 0 4
06
Douglas.'
With the rise of equitable

in 1909 by John Chipman Gray, was
by, among others, Oliver Wendell
Learned Hand, 10 5 and William 0.
lawmaking by judges has also come,

101. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
102. J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 172-73 (2d ed. 1921).
103. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
104. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 190 (1930); COURTS ON TRIAL, supra
note 76, at 292, et seq. (1949): Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F.2d 434, 439 n.12 (2d Cir.
1949); Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 620-22 (2d Cir. 1944).
105. United States v. Klinger, 199 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1952):
When we ask what Congress "intended," usually there can be no answer, if
what we mean is what any person or group of persons actually had in mind.
Flinch as we may, what we do, and must do, is to project ourselves, as best we
can, into the position of those who uttered the words, and to impute to them
how they would have dealt with the concrete occasion.
Archibald Cox, writing about Learned Hand's approach to legislative interpretation,
acknowledged: "There is truth . . . in the words of those who say that in applying a
statute a court cannot interpret only but must make new law to supplement the legislation." Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARv, L. REV.
370, 374 (1947).
106. Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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predictably and necessarily, the quite valid caution that lawmaking by
judges must not go too far: "Some have said it would be better if

judges here made law openly rather than behind the mask of purpose
interpretation. But it seems to the writer that-unlike plain meaning
-legislative "purpose" is helpful in providing a standard which ex07
pressly refers to something independent of the judge.'1
What is to save us from unrepresentative, antidemocratic law-

making by judges? And yet what is to save us from the injustice of a
legislatively unprovided-for contingency?'" 8 On the one hand, we

have Bishop Hoadly's oft-quoted epigram: "Nay, whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is He who

is truly the Law Giver to all intents and purposes, and not the Person
who first wrote and spoke them." 10 9 On the other hand, we have a
collective discontent and even outrage at the notion of scrupulously
applying a statute whose words inadvertently mandate an injustice. 110
It may be that the solution to the dilemma is the simple observation that if courts begin to go their own way in making new law as
they equitably construe statutes, legislatures can check them by legislating anew. That, perhaps, is the ultimate American accommodation-checks and balances. To the pragmatists among us, that working-relationship-type solution may seem best. To the romantics among

us, however, that solution may seem too cold, and even inadequate,
for it imprisons the gremlin without ever taking its measure, without

coming to understand its true character. One longs for a fuller exploration of the simpler solution of the Bolognese civilians, who identified the gremlin with the Divine essence, or of the Renaissance nat107. Kernochan, Old Statute and New Situation, 42 A.B.A.J. 75, 76 (1956).
108. Archibald Cox felt the weight of the dilemma and called it insoluble. Cox,
supra note 105, at 375.
109. Eighteenth century epigram, quoted in J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, supra note
76, at 294. Frank also quoted Thomas Hobbes' 17th century remark: "ITIhe Law may be
made to bear a sense, contrary to that of the Sovereign; by which means the Interpreter
becomes the legislator." Id. at 294 n.5.
110. Charles P. Curtis has attempted to resolve the dilemma by advocating a process
whereby courts would resolve these hard cases by placing themselves in the shoes of
the present or afuture legislature:
Let the courts deliberate on what the present or a future legislature would do
after it had read the court's opinion, after the situation has been explained, after
the court has exhibited the whole fabric of the law into which this particular bit
of legislation had had to be adjusted. The legislature would then be acting, if it
did act, in the light of the tradition of the whole of the law, which is what the
courts expound and still stand for.
Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAqD. L. RE . 407, 415-16 (1950).
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ural-law jurists, who found and came to know the gremlin as the light
of natural human reason, itself a reflection of the Divine light. One
wonders whether, if Aristotle's joinder of epieikeia with gnome was
more fully developed in today's jurisprudence, we might at last get
the true measure of that elusive gremlin."1 '
111. Roscoe Pound hinted at that joinder when he discussed a famous colloquy In
Langbridge's Case, [cited by Pound as Y.B. 19 Ed. III, 375] in which one of the judges
of the court of common pleas suggested that "the law" was the will of the justices.
"Nay," corrected the chief justice, "law is reason." Pound's conclusory observation was
that "[miere will, as such, has never been able to maintain itself as law." Pound, Courts
and Legislation, in SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD 202, 227 (1917). That is, law is in the
will of judges when they invoke epieikeia, but it will not be maintainable law unless
the judges are guided by the gnomd of reason.

